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This article explores one type of administrative mechanism to achieve high-quality 
patents: Article 115 of the European Patent Convention, which permits the inclusion of 
third parties to provide input to the prior art search and to communicate relevant 
information to the examiner in charge. Our empirical research analyzes the field of 
human genetic inventions. The empirical findings here show that third parties usually 
participate only after patents have been granted. Between 1999 and 2009, only a limited 
number of human gene patent cases made use of third-party, pre-grant interventions. 
There is thus an imbalance between third-party participation in the pre- and post-grant 
phase of patent prosecution, and we urge for greater participation of knowledge 
communities in the search and examination process. Europe should create a funnel for 
participation through advisory bodies and learned societies, which would allow judicious 
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The number of patent applications and patents granted has doubled over the past two 
decades. The emergence of new scientific and technological fields with little “prior art” 
has overwhelmed the ability of patent authorities throughout Europe to assess whether 
inventions meet the patentability requirements (novelty, industrial applicability, and 
inventive step). This increase in patent activity has also raised the issue of patent 
quality. Among the main concerns raised by policymakers, the business community, 
practitioners, academics and examiners is the extent to which patent examiners have 
adequate resources to perform their search and examination tasks. A careful search and 
examination procedure reduces the need to review patents when they are opposed, cuts 
down on litigation and contributes to the validity of patents that are granted. There are 
too few patent examiners which, coupled with the shortage of time available to search 
and examine patent applications, inflation in the number of filings, rapid developments in 
emerging fields of science and technology, have all increased uncertainty in the 
interpretation of the patentability criteria, and thus the quality of patents. 
 
Ensuring stable and high-quality patent rights is the most vital consideration for any 
patent office. It is acknowledged that high-quality patents1 are important for innovation, 
the diffusion of knowledge and economic growth. Concern for patent quality is not new, 
nor has it gone unaddressed by scholars (Burke and Reitzig, 2007; Edfjäll, 2007; 
Elsmore, 2009; Philipp, 2006; Shang, 2009; van Pottelsberghe, 2009; Wagner, 2009; 
White, 2004) and policy-makers (Cowan et al., 2007; European Commission, 2008; 
European Patent Office, 2009). However, there has been little analysis of the patent 
quality mechanisms used in patent offices. Mechanisms to achieve high-quality patents 
can follow the division of the legislative, executive and judicial functions of patent 
matters among separate and independent bodies. This article focuses more narrowly on 
the administrative mechanisms dealing with third-party participation in the patent 
process at the European level. In this jurisdiction, the principal process leading to the 
grant of a patent is search and examination. Article 115 of the European Patent 
Convention (EPC) permits the inclusion of third parties to provide input to the search of 
prior art and communicate relevant information to the examiner in charge. 
 
The aim of this article is to understand and assess how and when third parties may 
participate during the patent prosecution process. In particular, we provide an answer to 
the following research questions. First, to what extent have the current patent 
examination practices and the “peer-to-patent project” been effective in increasing 
patent quality? Second, how can external actors, specialized in the field contribute by 
providing information about the patentability of new inventions and be officially 
recognized by patent agencies?  
 
Our empirical research analyzes the field of human genetic inventions, within the area of 
biotechnology. In our view, biotechnology differs considerably from other sectors, in that 
it is the only domain to have a unified, sector-specific patent law. Moreover, the 
                                               
1
 High-quality patents should meet patentability requirements, contribute to the state of the art, offer scientific/social 
benefit, and stand up to the most rigorous challenges in court. 
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Biotechnology Directive 98/44/EC has brought new types of human intervention into the 
patent arena. To identify patent infringement cases involving human gene patents, we 
searched the Westlaw International Database, the EPO Board of Appeal Database 
(EBOA), as well as the esp@cenet network and the Register Plus service provided by 
the European Patent Office (EPO). The data retrieval strategy included the International 
Patent Class “C12”2 and the keywords “human gene” or “DNA” or “gene sequence” or 
“human stem cells”, and “gene & patent & opposition” in the claims or patent application 
abstract, in the notices of opposition that had been filed, and in the decision that had 
been made.   
 
The empirical findings here show that third parties usually participate only after patents 
have been granted. Patent decisions for the period 1999 and 2009, emphasize that only 
a limited number of human gene patent cases made use of third-party, pre-grant 
interventions. There is thus an imbalance in third-party participation in the pre- and post-
grant phase of patent prosecution, and the paper urges that knowledge communities 
should participate in the search and examination process. We recommend the 
involvement of two types of knowledge communities: learned societies and advisory 
bodies that specialize in particular emerging scientific and technological domains.  
 
New technologies are no longer regarded as entirely passive entities developed by 
inventors and used by customers; rather, they comprise complex actors and networks, 
involving laboratories, patients, technicians, families, geneticists and other stakeholders. 
This premise was tested empirically in the research presented here, which shows that 
certain stakeholders participated in the creation of the patent biotechnology regime, but 
that these stakeholders differ from the new stakeholders who participate in the pre- or 
post-grant phase. For example, in 2007 and 2008, the EPO‟s Opposition Division 
revoked several patents on human genes. The decision was a victory for the French 
Association of Research Institutes and Hospitals, Greenpeace and a number of genetic 
societies and patient organizations, scientific associations, cancer researchers and 
special interest groups. 
 
There are several established advisory bodies in the European biotechnology field, both 
at national and European level (e.g. National Bioethics Committees, National Socieities 
on Human Genetics, National Socieities of Biotechnology, the European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies), as well as learned societies (such as the 
European Society of Human Genetics, the European Federation of Biotechnology). In 
this article, the policy recommended is instead to following the American approach to 
third party involvement: Europe should create a funnel for participation through advisory 
bodies and learned societies, which will allow the search and examination process to be 
conducted judiciously, with a consequent improvement in patent quality.  
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the current 
European patent examination system and reviews the literature on external actors in 
patent prosecution. Section 3 deals with the “peer-to-patent” pilot programme which has 
been established by the United States Patent Office (USPTO) to encourage public 
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 International Patent Class “C12” includes patents in the field of biochemistry and genetic engineering. 
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participation on “prior art” inventions. Section 4 empirically investigates the involvement 
of actors in the search and examination process as related to recent human gene 
patents. In this section we also explore the potential that certain external actors, 
specialized in the field, have to provide information on biotechnology inventions and 
gene technologies, thus complementing the work of the patent examiners in the search 
and examination phase. Finally, Section 5 makes policy recommendations and 
concludes the article. 
 
2. The European Patent System and the Patent Quality Crisis 
 
In Europe, patents are regulated by the EPC, a multilateral treaty which institutes the 
European Patent Organization (EPOrg) and provides an autonomous legal body for 
granting European patents: the European Patent Office. The EPO is the centrepiece of 
the patent system in Europe and is constituted by 36 Contracting States, including the 
27 EU Member States. In line with Article 52 (1) of the EPC, the EPO grants patents to 
inventions that are new at the time the patent is filed, involve an inventive step that is not 
obvious to a person skilled in the art, and generate useful outcomes (Langinier and 
Moschini, 2002). After the patent application is filed, the EPO‟s Search Division draws 
up a Search Report relevant to the subject matter of the patent claim. Following Rule 44 
(1) and (2) EPC, the search examiner should indicate in the Search Report which 
documents (available to the EPO at the time the Search Report is conducted) and 
claims are considered to be relevant to decide whether the claimed invention is new and 
involves an inventive step. The Search Report is performed by the examiner and aims at 
finding all prior art information relevant to the patentability of the invention (Guellec and 
van Pottlesberghe, 2007). In addition, patent applications may undergo substantive 
examination by the Examination Division which is composed of three technical 
examiners. During this stage the Examining Division conducts an additional search of 
the patent application and claims, by looking at relevant prior art from other related 
applications or in other technical fields that are covered by the initial search           
(Akers, 2000).  
 
In addition, Rule 42 (1) (b) EPC requires that patent applicants indicate the background 
art in their patent application, which as far as known to the applicant, can be regarded 
as useful information for the examiners to understand the inventions, and draw up the 
European search report and examination. However, EPC provisions are not interpreted 
as placing an obligation on the applicants to communicate to the EPO examiners every 
item of prior art information relevant to the application. In many cases when applicants 
are not sure about the prior art, they wait for the examiner‟s search result and then 
consult the prior art themselves. By contrast, when the applicants are well informed 
about prior art, they submit every item of information of which they are aware. In this 
way, examiners end up faced with either a limited number of references or dozens of 
marginal references (Thomas, 2001). This, coupled with an increased number of patent 
applications (from about 20,000 in the early 1980s to more than 190,000 in 2005),             
the pressure to work faster to reduce the patent pendency rates, and the severely 
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limited employee schedule (10-15 hours per application3) means that patent examiners 
often fail to consider all references. Furthermore, patent offices have also witnessed an 
increase in patent applications that focus on technology fields (i.e. biotechnology 
inventions, gene patents, or computer programs) with sparse resources available for 
their examination (Duane, 2008). This has placed further stress on patent examiners 
since information on such inventions might be found in certain unwritten documents, oral 
or written disclosures known only to certain parties (third parties) which have knowledge 
of or operate using these new technologies. In this way, new technological 
developments have come to challenge the examiners‟ ability to acquire adequate 
information to examine patents. As Noveck (2006) claims, in some cases there is either 
too little information about prior art (i.e. computer software patents) or too much (i.e. 
biotechnology), and patent examiners lack the means to sift through it.  
 
To supplement the ability of the EPO examiners to locate relevant information on patent 
applications, the EPC has laid down Article 115, which provides that after the publication 
of the European patent application, third parties can communicate certain information or 
documents to the examiner in charge concerning the patentability of the invention for 
which an application has been filed. No fees are required for the submissions of 
observations and the person filing an observation may not be a party to the proceedings 
before the EPO. Third-party observations are also communicated to the applicant, who 
may comment on them. In this way, the provisions of Art.115 EPC provide mechanism 
by which relevant prior art undisclosed to the EPO examiners may be included in the 
patent prosecution proceedings. In effect, such observations may also supplement the 
scope of the EPO examiners‟ search and reduce their workload when locating prior art. 
The EPO‟s function in relation to third party observation is to review the patentability of 
the claimed inventions and determine whether the application can be upheld after the 
submission of observations (Harmon, 2006).  
 
The idea underlying the pre-grant observation process is to improve patent quality, but 
the mechanism still continues to be used rather infrequently (for details see Section 4). 
Akers (2000) indicates that a possible disincentive for some parties (especially private 
companies) to file observations may be their commercial and competitive interests. 
Prior-art observations may forewarn the applicant of the competitor‟s interest, so third 
parties wait until a patent has been granted before filing their opposition.4 EPO‟s one-
way communication with third parties is also a disincentive for these parties to file 
observations. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) claim that after observations are 
                                               
3 The number of hours spent examining each patent claim has more than halved since 1992, from 23.8 hours in 1992 
to 11.8 hours in 2001. 
4 According to Arts. 99-105 EPC, third parties can file an opposition within a period of 9 months after the EPO has 
decided to grant or refuse the application. Similar to the search and examination procedure, oppositions can be filed 
by any person (natural or legal). The notice of opposition is examined by the Opposition Division at EPO. The 
conclusion of the opposition proceedings can lead to the following outcomes: the opposition is rejected and 
consequently the patent is upheld without amendment; the patent is revoked; or the patent is amended (Art. 101 
EPC). According to Harhoff et al. (2007), it takes an average of 1.9 years to sort out an opposition case. The 
opposition procedure takes approximately 2.2 years if the patent is revoked and approximately 4 years if it is 
amended. The cost of opposition ranges between €15,000 and €25,000 for each party.  See also: Harhoff, D. et. al. 
“The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and competition policies” (2007). Available at: 
http://www.en.inno-tec.bwl.uni-muenchen.de/research/proj/laufendeprojekte/patents/stratpat2007.pdf                 
[Accessed September, 2010] 
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received, the Examination Division adds them into the file and decides whether any of 
the observations (which provide better arguments for the case) should be considered, 
but third parties are not informed of any further action the Division takes in response to 
their observations. Indeed, as we shall see in the next sections, patent examiners do not 
pay considerable attention to third-party observations, even when numerous filings are 
made. Patent examiners‟ decision to grant or revoke a patent application is not much 
affected by the observations of third parties (see Table 1.3). As a result, patent 
examiners‟ dialogue with other experts is quite underdeveloped. According to Hagel 
(2008),5 this practice has resulted in patent examiners suffering from the “ivory tower” 
syndrome. Insufficient use of Art. 115 EPC has led to the “isolation” of patent examiners 
from the real world and to increased legal uncertainty in the protection of new, emerging 
technologies. For all these reasons, the patent office has been increasingly challenged 
by litigation about the quality of patents issued, which reveals the weaknesses of the 
present patent assessment system. Current estimates by Holzer (2005) and Harhoff 
(2009) indicate that the number of patent opposition cases in Europe is about 1,260 per 
year, 600-700 instances of which relate to European patents. Most of the litigation 
comes from electrical engineering (165 cases), pharmaceuticals (149 cases),6 organic 
chemistry (including biotechnology with 141 cases), mechanical engineering (139 cases) 
and process engineering (113 cases).  
 
3. Mechanisms for Enhancing Patent Quality: Providing an Inclusive Patent 
Prosecution Process 
 
The patent prosecution problems are commonly acknowledged, and a number of patent 
scholars have recently proposed various mechanisms to improve the quality of patents 
and establish an inclusive patent prosecution process. In his recent work 
“Understanding of Patent Quality Mechanism”, Wagner (2009) argues that patent law is 
a specialized field with many active players. Focusing on the multi-actor characteristics 
of patent law, Elsmore (2009) and Wagner (2009) claim that high-quality patents will be 
issued only if patent offices balance the interests of active and passive users, and 
legislate an “open review procedure”, which would allow third parties to challenge 
patents after issue. Burke and Reitzig (2007), Edfjäll (2007) and White (2004) argue that 
the information flow among actors is important since it allocates additional resources to 
patent authorities, and ensures ongoing deliberations on the patentability of a variety of 
subjects. Information on patent claims contributes to the patents‟ clarity and leads to a 
more cost-effective examination process (Cowan et al., 2007). Patent offices should 
therefore allocate additional resources to examiners and ensure ongoing deliberations 
on the patentability of various subjects. Other scholars state that patent examiners‟ 
access to scientific and patent literature, and collaboration with commercial patent 
                                               
5
Staff Union of the European Patent Office. “Interview with Francis Hagel,” February, 2010. 
Available at: http://www.suepo.org/public/interviews/ex08013cp.pdf [Accessed March, 2010] 
6
 According to the European Commission sector inquiry into EU pharmaceuticals markets, companies initially reported 
a total of 698 separate patent lawsuits. However, a final judgment was reported in 149 of the suits (84 initiated by the 
generating company and 65 by the originating one), and 549 cases were reported as pending or settled.  
See: European Commission: Competition DG. “Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry - Preliminary Report” (2008).  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf  
 [Accessed March, 2010] 
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information providers or other institutions specialized in protecting certain industries, 
also provides high-quality outcomes (Philipp, 2006; White 2004).  
 
Scholars suggest that the multi-actor involvement and information flow are crucial to 
improving patent quality and ensuring legitimate outcomes. However, most of these 
mechanisms encourage participation after the decision to grant/revoke a patent has 
been made. According to Noveck (2006), ex-post solutions, such as “post-grant 
administrative review or proposals to revisit the scope of patentable subject matter and 
obviousness”, cannot work if the patent system lacks appropriate mechanisms for 
obtaining the requisite information on patentability. Opposition and invalidity proceedings 
cannot make a significant contribution to improving patent quality; collusion between 
prior art holder and the applicant may reduce the chances that granted patents will be 
invalidated in opposition proceedings (Thomas, 2001; SUEPO, 2002). However, while 
third-party challenges, and post-grant oppositions in particular, have periodically been 
studied by scholars (e.g Holman, 2008; Harhoff, 2009; van Pottelsberghe, 2009) and 
policy advisors (e.g. Cowan et al., 2007; Cohen et al, 2008), systematic analyses of the 
“pre-grant” observations introduced by third parties are rare. In our view, post-grant 
opposition procedures cannot build trust, legitimacy and quality within the current 
system if relevant stakeholders are not involved prior to a grant of protection to the 
claimed inventions.  
 
3.1. External Actors: Added Value to the Patent System 
 
Current trends in innovation reveal that in addition to traditional regulatory actors (i.e. 
government and private business), the informal actors of social control (i.e. laypeople 
and experts, NGOs) also influence the framework within which technology is regulated, 
at both the national and international level (Schrell et al., 2007). Since new technologies, 
such as biotechnology innovations, genetic testing or diagnostic methods, have become 
crucial to the development of public health and government plans to expand the 
knowledge economy and boost competitive strategies, there is a need for the innovation 
regulatory framework to create a balance among these various needs and actors. While 
advocates of technocracy argue that technical experts are more able to exercise 
professional judgment on new technologies and determine what is in society‟s best 
interests, others argue that such a focus is at odds with the principles of deliberative 
democracy (Brooks and Johnson, 1991; Picciotto, 2001). Modern societies should 
provide new forms of democracy which lead to improved decision making through 
communicative interaction and information, and an engagement between the social 
consensus and risk perception, both before and after decisions have been made. In 
respect to the innovation process, Brownsword (2008) argues that an effective 
innovation system can be achieved only if the regulation of new inventions involves a 
variety of actors in every regulatory phase. It is only in the first phase that regulators and 
other actors are provided with the opportunity to “control, confine and channel ex-ante” 
the operations and successful practice of inventions (Brownsword, 2008, p. 18).  
 
The academic literature on patent quality adds to the participatory debate, claiming that 
the “chain of innovation” consists of various actors that are affected by the “existing or 
potentially granted patents” and it is crucial that patent offices ensure actor involvement 
 7 
to providing relevant information both before and after patents are granted (Edfjäll, 
2007). In this respect, Shang (2009) contends that the inclusion of third parties in the 
examination process provides added value to patent quality, since parties (i.e. the patent 
owner, the challenger and the patent office) have better opportunities to assess the 
validity of questionable patents and new technology inventions. Scholarly debate reveals 
that patent examiners have technical qualifications, but their reluctance to use outside 
expertise has led patent offices to rely unduly on centralized organs of expertise, turning 
the problem of patent quality into a one that mostly relates to difficulties in accessing the 
right information (Noveck, 2006). Thus, while a patent examiner might have to spend 
hours searching for prior art, experts in the field may know instantly whether an 
invention interlinks with earlier work or research. Along the same lines, Harmon (2006) 
argues that the contribution of outside expertise, in the form of the scientific community, 
can remedy the patent examiners‟ information deficit and provide the basis for reducing 
the shortcomings of numerous innovations.  
 
Technological developments in the life sciences, biotechnology and especially plant 
biotechnology, cloning, and genetic testing, have added many other concerns to the 
examination process, such as the extent to which these inventions: a) meet the 
patentability requirements ; b) are industrially applicable; and c) meet with ethical and 
social principles. In particular, developments in gene technology have attracted the 
attention of numerous actors due to their socio-economic, health and research impacts. 
Gene patent applications differ from other inventions, since broad claims tend to form an 
intrinsic part of them, including information on nucleic acid sequences, fused cells, 
vectors, recombinant proteins, monoclonal antibodies that could subsequently be 
generated, etc. (Aymé et al, 2008, p.S6) 7. There have been many debates that question 
the novelty, non-obviousness, and risk of these new technologies and their effect in 
undermining scientific research, medical advancement and patient care. Broad claims 
may prevent researchers searching for cures for genetic diseases or impose 
unnecessary constraints on competition and downstream innovation. These challenges 
have made the input of external actors even more vital in order to keep patent 
examiners up to date with such scientific and social implications as the inevitable 
biotechnological inventions and other derivative technologies may have. For instance, 
the controversy over BRCA gene patents and the Edinburgh patent on human 
embryonic stem cells give a clear picture of the impact that various external actors (e.g. 
research institutes, genetic societies, environmental agencies, political parties, pro-life 
groups, national governments), have had, not only translating public criticism into 
mandatory requirements for changing the regulatory framework of patent law, but also 
serving as a crucial mechanism for making examiners more aware of the patentability of 
inventions. 
 
                                               
7
 According to the OECD definition, gene patents relate to one of the following four categories: “1) whole genes or 
parts of them, 2) proteins that the genes encode as well as their function in organisms, 3) vectors used for the transfer 
of genes from one organism to another, or 4) genetically modified cells or organisms used for the making of 
genetically modified products and the uses of genetic sequences or proteins for genetic tests”. See: Gold, Richard 
and Carbone, Julia. “Appendix B: Detailed Legal Analysis of Gene Patents, Competition Law and Privacy Law. 
Innovation Partnership” (2008). Available from: 
http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ieg/documents/cases/TIP_Myriad_Legal.pdf [Accessed August, 2010] 
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In one of its working papers “A Quality Strategy for the EPO” (2002), the Staff Union of 
the EPO concluded that high levels of patent quality will be achieved only if mechanisms 
for determining the patentability of inventions involve the collaboration of industrial 
research laboratories, the academic community, experts and laypeople, all of which are 
expected to assist examiners, broadening their views on patents and establishing 
systematic feedback on the quality of patent claims. “Exchange with the outside world” 
and inclusion of “expertise in areas that are not much represented in patent offices” are 
considered crucial mechanisms for improving patent quality (SUEPO, 2002; UK Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2006). However, these reports do not explain how such expertise 
can be incorporated into the patent prosecution process. Exceptionally, in 2007 the 
USPTO for the first time launched a mechanism for incorporating third-party 
contributions to the substantial examination process by means of a web-based platform 
open to the community at large.   
 
3.2. U.S. Peer-to-Patent: the Community Patent Review  
 
The U.S. Peer-to-Patent project provides for online, prior-art screening in which third 
parties are able to contribute to the USPTO examination process. The aim of this project 
is to test whether peer review and third-party participation can deliver any improvements 
to the USPTO patent examination process (Kao, 2006). Under this system, the patent 
examiner is obliged to perform a full examination of patents, but third parties can provide 
additional prior-art information for two months after the patent application has been 
published. Third parties can submit a request for patent application review by registering 
it online on the U.S. Peer-to-Patent website. Thereafter they can post a reference or 
notice of prior art that they believe is relevant for assessing the patentability of specific 
patent application. Third-party references are launched on a public-view page where 
others are able to view and comment on them and vote for the most relevant references 
for the examiners to consider. In this way a peer reviewer will access the U.S. Peer-to-
Patent programme “to rate patent claims, prior art submissions and other reviewers, and 
to comment on the patent or on specific prior art submissions” (Noveck, 2006, p.147). 
However, the USPTO will accept only those references and comments that gain the 
most votes from the users.  
 
The U.S. Peer-to-Patent system provides an added value in: a) enhancing transparency 
and actor involvement within the patent examination process; b) assessing the body of 
knowledge that exists among the general public in regard to certain inventions; c) 
providing examiners with supplementary information, thus saving their time when 
making decisions on patent applications; and d) enabling third parties to prevent 
possible infringements of their rights before the patent is issued. Nevertheless, the 
system also has its shortcomings. To begin with, in common with many other open, 
web-based applications, the U.S. Peer-to-Patent system requires only the applicants‟ 
first and last names. This level of anonymity may lead to a lack of accountability and 
limit the range of valuable submissions. The possibility of “gaming” in patent 
procurement by favouring one type of application over another may also jeopardize the 
effectiveness of the self-monitoring, online peer-review process (Kao, 2006). 
Additionally, by allowing everyone to introduce knowledge on the prior art, the USPTO 
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may run the risk of exposing itself to a mass of prior art references, which risks making 
the very notion of patentability quite specious. The examiner will be able to reject patent 
applications on the grounds of “novelty or non-obviousness” based on combinations of 
various prior-art references, even for those inventions which might actually be innovative 
(Duane, 2008). According to the results of the first 11 months of the U.S. Peer-to-Patent 
pilot study,8 the number of contributors registered (2000 participants registered, of which 
only 365 were active) in the system is much higher than the number of applications 
submitted by inventors for review (40 patents, all from large companies). This 
emphasizes the uneven participation of actors in the system and adduces concerns 
about the system‟s ability to ensure sustainable participation by both inventors and 
external actors (submitters).  
 
4. New Emerging Technologies: A challenge in Europe 
In Europe, worries about stakeholder involvement within the patent system date back to 
1998, when the European Union (EU) adopted the Biotechnology Patenting Directive 
98/44 (BPD). In sharp contrast to the traditional practice of patent law, which has mainly 
been concerned with machines and engineering challenges, the BPD brought new types 
of human intervention into the patent arena, often termed “biological material” and “living 
matter” (EU, 1998). These areas include gene sequences, cells, genetically modified 
organisms and other biological compounds (Schneider, 2009). The BPD provided for the 
use of modern biotechnology techniques that focus on the manipulation of biological 
material (including those involving materials of human origin) using genetic engineering. 
Therefore, from its beginning the harmonization and the patentability of the new 
technologies dictated the involvement of a variety of actors.  
 
On the one hand, industry has claimed that only the adequate protection of 
biotechnology inventions will make research and development profitable: e.g. 
submissions by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations 
(EFPIA), the European Association for Bioindustries (EuropaBio), and other industrial 
and trade associations part of the Forum for European Bio-Industry Coordination, (Salter 
and Jones, 2002). 
 
On the other hand, activist groups have claimed that patenting organisms and 
modifications of animals or the human genome are regarded as unethical, immoral and 
may place at risk farmers in the developing world and indigenous peoples: e.g. 
submissions by Greenpeace, Genetics Resources Action International, Rural 
Advancement Foundation International, the German Protestant Church, the European 
Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society, ActionAid. These activists were also 
supported by the Green Party Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who 
claimed that the new legislation would lead to monopoly rights being granted that would 
cause the commercialization of nature, biopiracy and high licensing fees, which would 
make medical treatment immensely expensive (Thaker, 2003). 
 
                                               
8
 Allen,N. et.al. “Peer to Patent: First Anniversary Report” 2008. The Centre for Patent Innovation.1-37.  
Available at: http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/P2Panniversaryreport.pdf [Assessed May, 2010] 
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In this way, patenting in the field of genetics has drawn together a large number of 
representatives, laypeople and special interest groups to challenge the legitimacy of 
biotechnology inventions. Developments in genetics have also led to major debates 
between the EU institutions and various civil society and scientific bodies. The BPD was 
initially conceived as a purely technical operation, but it took ten years for the 
Commission, the Council, the European Parliament,9 and a range of advocacy groups to 
resolve issues concerning whether human cells, genes, and isolated parts of the human 
body (including gene sequences) should be considered patentable objects (Andreasen, 
2009). The implementation of the BPD in 1998 brought many changes to EPO practice. 
For the first time, the BPD specified the ordre public and morality exceptions, and 
addressed the patentability of the human body and parts isolated from it. The BPD 
introduced a new basis for the protection of biotechnology inventions. Art. 5 and 6 BPD 
are important since they provide a list of examples of inventions that can (or cannot) be 
patented (Art. 5 BPD), and of inventions for which the commercial exploitation could be 
considered contrary to ordre public or morality (Art. 6 BPD), (EU 1998).  
 
Most importantly, it is not the intention that the BPD should affect the basis of patent law 
(i.e. patent criteria, settlement of infringements), nor does it create the authority to grant 
patents; rather, it is intended to determine explicitly what biotechnological inventions 
Member States shall protect under their national patent laws (Soini et al., 2008). The 
conceptualization of the BPD articles (e.g. whether “research cloning” should be 
classified as “cloning” or whether embryos should be classified as “human beings”), the 
scope of patents in critical fields, and the interpretation of how claims may translate into 
potential products/processes, is left to the EPO‟s expertise (Schneider, 2009). Indeed, 
developments in biotechnology and human genetics have introduced a need for the 
patent examiners to evaluate applications by weighing their impact on ordre public and 
morality as well. This requires the availability of a degree of expertise that is not 
represented in patent offices.10  
 
The EPO‟s current practice reveals that the examination and exclusion of genetically 
engineered products or human gene sequences is still determined by the use of 
standard patentability principles, and no specific test is applied to biotechnology 
inventions. This practice has started to bring many challenges to the examination 
process, since applicants are filing broad patent applications, involving extensive 
biological sequence information for each individual claim without clearly disclosing the 
useful functions that these inventions could perform (Andrew, 2002; Guellec et al., 
2007). In this way, the assessment of gene patents and the granting of high-quality 
patents for inventions that provide a specific, credible industrial application, and are 
novel and non-obvious to the person skilled in the art, has proved to be difficult at times. 
                                               
9
 In the case of human genetics, EP has been more sceptical than the Commission about the potential development 
of these new technologies. As such, during the periods of 1898, 1973, 1997, 1998 and 2000, the EP issued various 
resolutions on the ethical and legal problems of genetic engineering, and on the legal status of the human embryo, 
requiring the Member States to prohibit any gene transfer to human germ line cells and to ban the cloning of human 
beings. These issues also led to extended debates on establishing BPD 98/44 EC.  
See: Salter, B., Jones, M. “Regulating human genetics: The changing politics of biotechnology governance in the 
European Union”, 4 Health, Risk & Society 325-340 (2002) 
 
10
 See also: Nuffield Council on Bioethics. “The Ethics of Patenting DNA” (2002). 
 Available from: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/patenting-dna  [Accessed  October, 2010] 
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It is relatively difficult for the gene sequences to fulfill some of the patentability criteria as 
they already exist in nature, or there is failure to prove their applicability. Above all, 
information on gene patents cannot be retrieved easily and in good time. According to 
USPTO estimates, a search of 100 sequences requires approximately 15 hours of 
computing time, whereas it takes 65 hours of examiner time to evaluate these search 
results. Moreover, to provide a qualitative expertise to patent applications in the field of 
gene sequences, even for a small number of applications, an enormous number of 
senior-level staff would be need, which obviously is far beyond the working capacity and 
time-frame within which examiners operate (Ganguli, 2001). These challenges have 
made the field of gene patents the topic of many heated discussions and intense 
scrutiny from a number of actors, both in Europe and around the world. However, there 
are no empirical analyses to date of the way these external actors have been 
incorporated within the patent prosecution process and whether they can provide a 
means by which the patent examiners can issue high quality patents.   
 
4a) Empirical Evidence on Human Gene Patents  
 
To assess the participation of various actors within the patent prosecution process we 
started searching the Westlaw International Database. Using this database, we 
identified patent opposition cases involving human gene patents, including declaratory 
judgment actions filed by the plaintiff and the Opposition Division. We began by looking 
at the European Patent Report within the Westlaw International Database, searching for 
patents that included the keywords “gene & patent & opposition” in the claims or patent 
application abstract, in the notices of opposition that had been filed, and in the decision 
that had been made. The search results gave us 38 patent opposition cases dealing 
with gene patents (including plants and animals) for the period 1999-2009. To narrow 
down our search scope to human gene patents, we used the terms “human & gene” as 
the main locators within the results, and retrieved 13 patent opposition cases dealing 
with human genetics (i.e. vectors used for the transfer of genes from one organism to 
another, therapeutic proteins, genetic testing, DNA sequences, gene therapy, and 
human stem cells).  
 
Bearing in mind the relatively small number of cases we retrieved on the first attempt to 
define human gene patent opposition cases, we conducted a second search, this time of 
the EPO Board of Appeal Database. To provide additional data to our previous hits from 
the Westlaw International Database, we searched the EBOA decisions Database 
looking for any patent with respect to which a notice of opposition had been filed and 
with claims that included any of the following terms: “human gene” or “DNA” or “human 
stem cells” or “gene sequence”. This search resulted in many hits, but we focused on 
the patent cases which, according to the EBOA Database, had a higher ranking of hits 
within their documents. In particular, we found 17 patent opposition cases in this 
database (30 cases in total from both databases) (see Table. 1.1). However, since 
neither the Westlaw International Database nor the EBOA Database provided us with 
detailed data on the patent examination proceedings and the actors involved from the 
search/examination phase up to the final decision, we searched the EPO‟s Register Plus 
and the esp@cenet database. These databases provide detailed information on the 
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legal status of the European patent applications as well as the documents submitted 
during all phases of the patent prosecution process.  
We acknowledge that this combination of searches does not represent every case on 
human gene patent prosecution, but we believe they give a clear picture of actors‟ 
participation in the examination process, and the impact they have had on the 
Examination Division‟s decision (i.e. to revoke or grant the application).  
 





Source: Authors‟ reprocessing of data retrieved from Westlaw International Database, esp@cenet 
and EBOA 
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Our study‟s findings confirm that third-party participation differs considerably as between 
the pre- and post-grant phases. Pre-grant patent observations pursuant to Art. 115 EPC 
are submitted only in a limited number of cases (viz. EP92306420; EP94913175; 
EP95305601; EP91900640; EP91903051; EP83307553), whereas post-grant 
oppositions have been filed in every case (see Table 1.1 and 1.3). 
 
Comparing the intensity of actor involvement in all phases of patent prosecution 
process, post-grant oppositions are evidently more dynamic than pre-grant patent 
observation activities. However, it is interesting to note that the reverse results are 
observed when it comes to the variety of actors involved. The pre-grant patent 
observation phase includes a variety of actors from different sectors (e.g. patent 
attorneys, patent professionals, research institutions, special interest and religious 
groups, medical organizations, patients etc.), whereas post-grant observations are 
entered by only a limited number of actors and reveal a growing disagreement on patent 
practices between private actors (research centres-universities and companies).  
 
 








In most cases (Tables 1.2 and 1.3), observers and opponents argue that gene patent 
applications hardly meet the patentability requirements. These parties argue that the 
claimed inventions are not novel, do not involve an inventive step, and fail to provide 
industrial applicability. This evidence also supports the arguments made in foregoing 
sections that, since applicants have the tendency to file broad patents, they usually fail 
clearly to disclose the inventions and their application. In some cases, mainly in those 
applications where pre-grant observations are mostly encountered, third parties argue 
that patent applications are contrary to the ordre public or morality. This emphasizes that 
observers have focused not only on the novelty of certain inventions but also the 
accuracy, safety and usefulness of certain products and processes. However, our 
empirical evidence still shows that third-party observations (pursuant to Art. 115 EPC) 
have had a marginal effect on the patentability decisions on numerous inventions in the 

































Source: Authors‟ reprocessing of data retrieved from Westlaw International Database, esp@cenet 
and EBOA  
 
In particular, in the case of Myriad Genetics‟ European Patent (EP95305601) on the 
BRCA1 gene, more than 100 observations were submitted to the Examination Division 
from a variety of actors (e.g. hospitals, scientists, research laboratories, physicians, 
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patient organizations), who claimed that the patent application: was not novel (since 
many other methods already existed for diagnosing a predisposition to breast cancer); 
lacked inventiveness (since the patentees mainly benefited from prior research 
conducted by an international consortium on BRCA in collaboration with patients and 
families); and lacked sufficient and adequate description and disclosure of the claimed 
invention (Andrew, 2002).However, a patent was still granted, which led to many 
opposition filings, appeals and long debates among stakeholders until a decision was 
made to amend and keep the patent in amended form.   
 
Other patent cases, such as EP83307553 (on molecular cloning and characterization of 
a further gene sequence coding for human relaxin); EP91903051 (on a method for gene 
expression by way of homologous recombination); EP94913175 (on a method for 
inserting a heterologous gene coding sequence into a targeted endogenous gene) and 
EP91900640 (on a method used to transfer genes from one organism to another), 
reveal that third parties have submitted fewer observations as compared to the 
EP95305601, and their impact on the decision of the Examination Division continues to 
be marginal.  
 
The case of EP92306420 (on a process for the production of a recombinant human 
antibody) also provides important information on the way third-party observations are 
filed. In this case observations were submitted inappropriately, providing inputs with no 
value to patent examiners.  
 
To understand and observe the interests of third parties in providing information on the 
patentability of new inventions, we also looked at the WARF patent case (EP96903521). 
This application was refused in 2004 by the EPO‟s Examination Division on morality 
grounds. Subsequently, WARF appealed and the Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) 
which heard the appeal referred the case with questions to the Enlarged Board. 
Pursuant to Art.11 (b), EBOA requested parties to provide opinions on the WARF case 
(Salter, 2009). Following this request, third parties submitted more than 200 amicus 
curiae briefs (Art. 120 EPC) expressing their support for or objections to the patentability 
of human embryonic stem cells. Part of our analysis of human gene patents included the 
G0001/4 Oppinion, in which a number of amicus curiae briefs were filed by a number of 
actors expressing opinions on the application of diagnostic methods to the human body 
(see Table 1.3). Both of these cases are important to our study as they emphasize the 
willingness of third parties to provide opinions and observations on the protection of 
human gene inventions. 
 
5. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions 
What do the uses of Art. 115 EPC on human gene patents tell us? The controversy 
about these sensitive inventions reflects a growing social awareness of the uncertainties 
on which patent examiners base their decisions. In contrast to past practice, in which 
patenting issues were merely considered as part of a technical process, biopatent 
developments have come to attract greater public participation. Human gene patents 
and the associated disputes have drawn together a large number of scientific community 
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representatives, laypeople and special interest groups to challenge the legitimacy of the 
EPO‟s granting practice.  
 
The BPD has settled the legality of patenting biotechnology, but it has failed to satisfy 
certain stakeholders, who have used patent prosecution as a downstream mechanism to 
influence the scope of the protection of new, emerging technologies. As emphasized in 
Section 4, case-law evidence in human gene patents clearly reflects that third-party 
participation has not proved to have a demonstrable impact. By means of Art. 115 EPC, 
third parties have submitted a number of observations on the patentability of inventions.  
 
Observations have been filed in different ways: a) observations with no value to the 
patent examiner (i.e. EP92306420); b) observations filed only by a limited number of 
private parties (i.e. EP94913175; EP91903051; EP91900640); and c) numerous 
observations filed by third parties from different sectors (i.e. EP95305601; 
EP96903521). This practice has caused patent examiners either to have no information 
or to be overwhelmed with dozens of marginal observations on patentability, but not 
even a handful of references that could contribute to the granting of high quality patents. 
Indeed, if the EPO is to improve the quality of the patents it grants, it should make the 
search and examination process a forum for lively re-engagement by creating a route for 
the participation of knowledgeable bodies, which have knowledge of genetic engineering 
and human genetics issues, include a wide range of actors within their network, and 
represent the common interests of the society. 
 
The disputes and dilemmas associated with the protection and regulation of 
biotechnology inventions have already led the establishment of various forms of 
knowledgeable bodies acting as biotechnology information agents to provide information 
on new technology inventions, regulate advice on the trajectories of sensitive 
technologies, and foster innovation through networking efforts and collaboration with 
other specialist entities in the field. For instance, at the national level there are 
numerous scientific societies and research institutions (e.g. Austrian Forum Gene 
technology and Us; Austrian Society for Genetics and Gene Technology; German 
Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology; German Society of Human Genetics; 
the Netherlands Society for Biotechnology; the Spanish Society of Biotechnology; Royal 
Society of UK; the British Society of Human Genetics; Flanders Interuniversity Institute 
for Biotechnology; the Swedish Royal Academy of Science), environmental interest 
groups (e.g. Greenpeace, the Environmentalist NGO group “Friends of the Earth”) and 
advisory bodies (e.g. the Danish Board of Technology and the Danish Council of Ethics; 
the French Commission of Bimolecular Genetics; the Commission of Genetic 
Resources; the Commission of Genetic Improvements, and the Committee of Ethics; the 
Secretariat for Biotechnology Information in Germany; the German Council of National 
Ethics; the National Ethics Committee of Luxembourg; the Royal Academy of Arts and 
Sciences in Netherlands; the Swedish Gene Technology Advisory Board; the Human 
Genetics Commission in UK; the UK Nuffield Council of Bioethics) (see more: Moses 
et.al.,2002; Soini et al., 2008).  
 
These societies have close joint ventures with many other specialists drawn from the 
universities, research institutions, industry, health professionals in medical research and 
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genetic services, as well as non-government entities that establish networks between 
scientists and society at large. It is interesting to note that these groups have been 
active nationally, providing information, workshops, forums, guidelines and position 
papers on life science technologies, including issues of genetic engineering, human 
genetics, stem cells, biochemistry, molecular bioscience, medicine, etc. However, their 
participation in the patent prosecution process remains marginal. Our empirical evidence 
(see Table 1.3.) shows that, of all the societies mentioned above, the only active ones 
are the German Society of Human Genetics; the British Society of Human Genetics and 
Greenpeace. 
 
At the European level, biotechnology – human gene technology in particular – has 
attracted the attention of certain advisory bodies and learned societies. The creation of 
the Group of Advisers to the European Commission on the Ethical Implications of 
Biotechnology (GAEIB) (afterwards renamed the European Group on Ethics in Science 
and New Technologies (EGE)) has been very valuable to the development of 
biotechnology. The EGE‟s mission is to provide opinions after considering and 
comparing the work of other national ethics committees, as well as other international 
and European legal instruments. As such, EGE aims to establish fundamental ethical 
principles, support the right of civil society and advise “Community authorities 
responsible for regulating the market to account for public aspirations in the various 
aspects of their lives: consumers, workers, parents, patients etc.” (EGE, 2001) From the 
beginning, the GAEIB‟s creation changed the representation of stakeholders‟ interests in 
life science technologies. During its initial development stages GAEIB played a crucial 
role in advising the Commission that effective developments in EU biotechnology require 
extensive coordination with numerous stakeholders both inside and outside the 
Commission (Daviter, 2009). Following the GAEIB, EGE has continuously provided 
advice in the form of “opinions” at the request of the President or in certain cases 
independently. In July 1997 the EP also required the EGE to guarantee Parliament‟s 
involvements in its ethical deliberations. The EGE‟s opinions have been important in the 
development of the Biotechnology Directive and the European Research Framework 
Programme on the use of human embryos, with which the role of the bioethics gained 
institutional recognition in the policy making process. The rules of the BPD also 
advocate for the inclusion of the EGE in the evaluation of all ethical aspects of 
biotechnology and the provision of consultancy  on sensitive issues, including patent law 
(Article 7 and Recital 44) (Salter and Jones, 2002). These requirements have led the 
EGE to become an active player in the field of human genetics, providing opinions on 
gene therapy, cloning and the genetic modification of animals, genetic diagnosis, human 
tissue banking, etc.  
 
In Europe, the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) is among the best-known 
learned societies in Europe. ESHG was established in 1967 and has continuously 
provided recommendations and reports on gene patenting, diagnostic testing and public 
health aspects (see Aymé et al., 2008; Soini et al., 2008). Most importantly, ESHG is 
known for its initiatives in promoting research, ensuring high standards and fostering the 
debate in the human genetics community on human and medical genetics, while 
providing background documents and recommendations (e.g. “The European Journal of 
Human Genetics”; “Patenting and licensing in genetic testing: ethical, legal and social 
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issues”, 2008; “Genetic testing and common disorders: proposed recommendations of 
the European Society of Human Genetics”, 2009). Among the most important 
committees of the ESHG are: the Public and Professional Policy Committee (PPPC) and 
Patenting and Licensing Committee (PLC). In 2007, PPPC and PLC, at the request of 
the ESHG, looked at the issue of patenting in relation to genetic testing while analyzing 
the most contemporary literature on patenting and human genes, and recent reports 
produced by the Council of Europe, OECD, UNESCO and other international 
organizations. These documents were reviewed by several experts, such as academic 
lawyers, experts of the EPO and NGOs, and were published in the European Journal of 
Human Genetics (ESHG, 2007 and 2008). ESHG has been in regular contact with 
different directorates of the EU Commission and scientific organizations, as well as 
major diagnostic biotechnology companies, discussing complex issues related to human 
genetics.11 In regard to the patent prosecution process, in 2004 ESHG submitted 
opinions to the EBOA in relation to the interpretation of the patent exemption for 
diagnostic methods under Art. 52 (4) EPC (see Table 1.3), and in 2006 ESHG 
representatives filed oppositions to the BRCA1 gene patents.12  
 
In addition, ESHG has been collaborating with other well-known organs in the 
biotechnology area. For instance, the European Federation of Biotechnology (EFB) is 
another independent learned society that consists of 50 members from all EU and other 
European countries, and 90 scientific societies. Its members are drawn from industry, 
government, environmental and research organizations, as well as practitioners. As 
such, the EFB has become a federation of “National biotechnology associations, learned 
societies, universities, scientific institutes, biotechnology companies and individual 
biotechnologists, working to promote biotechnology throughout Europe”.13 EFB 
comprises six task groups, among which are the Task Group on Innovation, Safety in 
Biotechnology, and Public Perception in Biotechnology. The aim of the EFB and its task 
groups is to provide an interdisciplinary international forum, foster public understanding 
and collaboration with scientists, and promote research and innovation on various 
subjects including biotechnology, patents, nanotechnology and plant biodiversity, inter 
alia. In addition, the EFB also aims to provide guidelines, position papers, reviews and 
expertise in life science technologies.14  
 
Taking into consideration the potential of the above knowledge communities (learned 
societies and advisory bodies) to provide information on biotechnology and human 
genetics, it is important that the EPO makes use of these entities by establishing the 
right incentives for them to contribute to the patent examination process. EPO should 
                                               
11
 In 1991 ESHG also contributed to the creation of the European Alliance of Genetic (later called as: European 
Alliance of Patient and Parent Organisations for Genetic Services and Innovation in Medicine), which comprises 
national genetic alliances and disease-specific patient groups that have an interest in innovative medicine, genetics 
and biotechnology. This alliance aims to provide position papers and statements on various subjects covering 
diagnosis, stem cells, gene and tissue therapy, bio-banks testing, patenting and IP, inter alia. See:  European Society 
of Human Genetics. “Are we there yet?”, 2007. ESHG Newsletter No.16 
12
 Gert Matthijs, one of the members of the ESHG, submitted observations and oppositions claiming the invalidity of 
the Myriad patent application. 
13
 See also: “The European Federation of Biotechnology”. Available at: http://www.efbweb.org/who/organi1.htm 
14
 See also:  Moses, V.et al. “Biotechnology: Educating the European Public-final report”, 2002. Brussels, Belgium: 
European Commission, 246-251 
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have an optimized number of carefully selected external actors, effectively managed, 
with whom collaborations could be developed. In our view, EPO can improve the quality 
of its patents and its collaboration with third parties by establishing a lively pre-grant 
patent advisory forum that operates on a regular or a case-by-case specific basis, for 
the most sensitive cases only, and will enable learned societies and advisory bodies to 
analyze patent application claims, provide information on the potential of inventions and 
share expertise. Professional or learned societies, for instance, can issue reports on the 
patentability of inventions and their potential for the state of the art, to simplify the 
examination process and broaden the expertise on new technology developments. This 
would assist EPO to be more selective when granting patents, to reduce backlogs and 
costly litigation procedures. Most importantly, since these entities differ in their level of 
expertise and prior-art knowledge of genetics, as well as their geographic 
representation, an advisory forum would inform the EPO examiners about the 
implications that certain inventions may have in other countries, and on the new genetic 
mechanisms that are likely to be protected in future. In this way, a pre-grant advisory 
forum would lead to a multidisciplinary foresight and an ex-ante patent impact 
assessment, would provide additional resources to the examiners, and ensure ongoing 
deliberations and better collaboration among experts on the patentability of numerous 
subjects. Most importantly, it would improve the analytical capacity of the patent 
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